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How the EU can Save NATO 
Sven Biscop  
The European Union can save NATO. It 
really can. Trust me.  
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and of the need for European allies to spend 
more. They were echoed by the President 
himself in his first speech to a joint session of 
Congress (on 28 February), in which he put a 
positive spin on things: “We strongly support 
NATO […]. But our partners must meet their 
financial obligations. And now, based on our 
very strong and frank discussions, they are 
beginning to do just that”. Which is just as 
well, for otherwise the US might have to 
“moderate” its own contribution to NATO, in 
Mattis‟ words.  
 
Clearly, the US has no intention of being 
moderate about the 2%. Allies‟ concrete plans 
on how to reach it are expected by the end of 
the year. Can and should Europe meet this 
American demand?  
 
FACTS AND FIGURES  
It does seem as if the US has forgotten that in 
Wales Allies saw this as a target for 2024. They 
agreed to “aim to move towards the 2% 
guideline within a decade”, as the Wales 
Summit Declaration rather timidly put it. It is 
neither very fair nor very realistic to expect 
Allies to accelerate the increase in defence 
spending at short notice. The US itself will 
indeed significantly increase its defence 
budget, with a massive $54 billion per year, 
though it remains to be seen to what end (and 
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Do a country‟s defence needs diminish when 
its GDP shrinks? Perhaps the opposite is true. 
This is why spending a fixed percentage of 
GDP is not the best measure to guide and 
assess a nation‟s defence effort. What use is a 
defence budget equalling 2% of GDP (the 
target that NATO Allies reconfirmed at the 
2014 Wales Summit) when it is spent on 
structures and platforms that bring prestige or 
jobs – but that don‟t address the priority 
capability shortfalls identified by both NATO 
and the EU? Or when there is no will to 
actually deploy any capability? As a Chinese 
general said to US general Joseph Stilwell 
during World War Two: why would I deploy 
my beautiful, newly American-equipped army 
against the Japanese – that might spoil it!
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Unfortunately, the 2% has become a fetish in 
the transatlantic defence debate – and has 
been reaffirmed as such by the new US 
administration. And President Trump does 
seem to be a man who takes his fetishes 
seriously, or so his fiery hairdo and necktie 
suggest.  
On their recent visits to Europe, both Vice-
President Pence and Defence Secretary Mattis 
gave a strong message: of support for NATO, 
and of the need for European allies to spend 
more. They were echoed by the President 
himself in his first speech to a joint session of 
Congress (on 28 February), in which he put a 
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what the impact on other federal programmes, 
including the State Department, will be). On a 
recent visit to the US I met sceptical voices 
even in the military who questioned the 
wisdom of a major budget increase without 
clear purpose – acquiring kit for the sake of 
having it. In any case, the US is not Europe, 
where the state assumes many more 
responsibilities, which cannot just be slashed 
to the benefit of the defence budget.  
 
Europeans must be fair themselves, however, 
and admit that with a very few exceptions, 
they saw Wales as just another pledge that they 
never seriously intended to keep. Similarly, 
they must own up to the fact that they have 
not addressed the major shortfalls in their 
arsenals, even though they have been 
identified some two decades ago, and in spite 
of regularly promising to do so. As a result, 
Europe remains extremely dependent on the 
availability of American strategic enablers, 
without which it can only deploy and sustain 
force with great difficulty. European defence 
spending has bottomed out and is now slowly 
increasing, but that does not mean that 
Europeans “are beginning to do just that”: the 
large majority of countries will never spend as 
much as 2% of GDP on defence.  
 
Nor do they have to. The real problem of the 
European defence effort is its fragmentation. 
The EU28 spend some €200 billion a year on 
defence – but a large share of that money is 
simply wasted by maintaining 28 separate 
defence establishments and 28 greatly 
overlapping support structures, and by 
investing in what the national defence industry 
produces rather than in what is needed. 
Increasing the budget without rectifying this 
fragmentation would mean that an equally 
large share of the additional money would be 
wasted as well. If Europe would cut all the 
dead wood (all unusable “capabilities” and all 
unnecessary duplication), it could build the  
 forces that it needs at a cost below 2% of 
GDP.  
 
That does not mean that some individual 
countries (including my own) do not need to 
do more: those hovering around 1% are 
destroying the effectiveness of their armed 
forces, and are breaking solidarity with their 
fellow EU Member States. If everybody would 
reach the EU-average of about 1.5%, that 
would suffice to serve Europe‟s needs, as 
defined by the EU‟s Global Strategy and by 
NATO‟s Strategic Concept. Of course, 1.5% is 
as artificial a number as 2% – but it is much 
more affordable and, most importantly, there 
is no need to spend more than we need.  
 
The difficulty is: how to sell these alternative 
but true facts about European defence to 
Donald Trump?  
 
AMERICA NO LONGER FIRST (IN 
NATO)  
With this US administration there will be no 
business as usual. If the US feels that 
Europeans are not pulling their weight, a 
President who does not particularly like 
Europe in the first place will not hesitate to 
react. Furthermore, Trump feels that the view 
that Europeans must finally be forced to pull 
their weight is shared far beyond the White 
House, notably in Congress, but also in 
academia and the think-tanks,
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 not to mention 
the wider public (or at least the part of the 
public that follows him on Twitter, and for 
whom he has to continue to perform his act). 
Given that today America comes first in terms 
of its contribution to NATO, “moderating” 
that contribution will not be difficult.  
 
The US could easily signal its discontent, for 
example, by reducing its current contribution 
of 22% to NATO‟s common funding. This 
mostly covers the cost of NATO HQ in 
Brussels and of the NATO command 
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structure, and the NATO Security Investment 
Programme in infrastructure and systems 
supporting these. The sums involved are not 
huge (some €2.2 billion for 2017) and so the 
effect would not be dramatic, but the message 
would be clear enough without affecting the 
US capacity to steer Alliance decision-making 
and without loss of US prestige.  
 
Much more powerful and potentially dramatic, 
at least for the Europeans, would be if the US 
would actually withhold American enablers the 
next time Europeans request their support for 
a non-Article 5 operation. Imagine the 2011 
Libyan air campaign without US participation: 
Europeans might still have pulled it off, but at 
much greater risk, with much delay, and only 
with a lot of improvisation. US interests would 
not be directly threatened, but Europeans 
would directly feel the impact of their non-
investment in the priority capability shortfalls. 
A “light” version of this tactic would be to still 
make American enablers available but making 
Europeans pay for them – an option that was 
actually briefly raised during the Libya 
campaign.  
 
Europeans cannot simply tell the US therefore 
that, having thought it over, they feel that the 
2% is not the right target after all. That would 
also encourage those, including perhaps 
Trump himself, for whom much more radical 
options for the future of NATO are on the 
table as well. What Europeans must do, if they 
don‟t want to spend 2% of GDP on defence 
(and they don‟t) is to say: look, we are not 
going to do the 2%, but here is what we are 
going to do instead, which will actually be a lot 
more useful.  
 
THE EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVE  
What Europeans should do instead, is what 
they have been talking about for almost a year 
now, since the British vote for Brexit and the 
publication of the EU Global Strategy in June 
2016: Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO).  
 
Spending 2% of GDP on defence is a mere 
input measure. The only way of convincing the 
US to forget about that is to present it with a 
real output measure: which strategic enablers 
and which force packages that Europe cannot 
field today, will it field tomorrow? Which can 
also be translated as: which operations that 
Europe alone is not capable of today, will it be 
capable of tomorrow?  
 
This Europeans can only do collectively, by 
pooling their efforts. Because, first, the answer 
to the problem of fragmentation described 
above is integration and, second, because no 
individual European state has the means and 
the scale any longer to make a difference all by 
itself. This holds true for strategic enablers 
especially, the area in which Europe is the most 
dependent on the US, and which is the most 
capital-intensive. Hence any project to develop 
and procure strategic enablers (tanker aircraft, 
satellites, drones etc.) requires a big critical 
mass of participating states to make it 
economically viable.  
 
Europeans could do this in different 
frameworks, but PESCO is a ready-made 
mechanism and it has one great advantage over 
all the alternatives: if it can be linked to the 
European Commission‟s proposal for a 
European Defence Fund, it will come with 
money attached. The Commission envisages a 
fund of €5 billion per year. The entry fee for 
PESCO could be that the states who join 
together contribute half of that, in return for 
which the other half could come from the EU 
budget, for the total then to be spent through 
PESCO on the priority capability shortfalls 
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which the states have already identified (in the 
EU as well as NATO).  
 
Implementing this EU mechanism would be the 
surest way of generating the additional 
capabilities that can satisfy the US that Europe 
does take defence seriously and that therefore 
NATO remains a viable alliance – because 
something is in it for the US too.
3
  
 
Europeans do not have to review their defence 
effort just because the US asks them too, 
however. Not even because they are  threatened 
by Russia, because they are not: together the 
EU28 have 1.5 million people in uniform, which 
is twice as much as Russia, not to mention the 
economic disparity. If NATO‟s conventional 
deterrence appears credible only thanks to the 
US, that is because Europeans feel weak, not 
because they are weak (while Russia is weak but 
acts strong).  
 
The main reason why a truly European defence 
is necessary is twofold. First, Europeans spend 
an enormous amount of money but get precious 
little capability for it in return. Military 
integration will create synergies and effects of 
scale that will allow Europeans to generate more 
capabilities in a much more cost-effective way. 
Second, the more Europeans integrate their 
militaries, the more they will have to think 
together, and the more in the end they will act 
together. Once they start behaving as if they had 
a single force, they no longer need to feel weak 
in the face of Russia or any other challenge in 
their neighbourhood. In the end, military 
integration is about creating a change of mind.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Everything that I have advocated above is quite 
possible. It might even get done. But will it get 
done in time to forestall a serious row among 
transatlantic allies? The lively debate about 
PESCO has yet to result in decisions. And with 
the French elections approaching, followed by 
the summer and then elections in Germany, it 
will be autumn before serious decisions can be 
taken. After debating PESCO so intensely, it will 
become politically difficult not to activate it. But 
that carries the risk that some states who are not 
actually convinced will activate it only then not 
to do anything that they couldn‟t have done 
without PESCO – and then the opportunity will 
be wasted.  
 
At the end of May already, there will be a 
“NATO Special Meeting” in Brussels. That 
comes too soon to expect anything of substance, 
including from the US, because the 
administration simply is not yet in place. But if 
anything will be discussed on the occasion of 
President Trump‟s first visit to Europe, it will be 
burden-sharing. A reminder to the Europeans 
that the moment to stop talking about European 
defence and to just do it, has come.  
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Endnotes 
1
 One can see how Stilwell acquired his nickname of Vinegar Joe, though in fairness, his caustic 
personality predated his encounter with the Chinese armed forces. See: Graham Peck, Two Kinds of Time 
(Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2008).  
2 Many have now come out as “restrainers”, in the wake of Barry Posen‟s important book: Restraint – A 
New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2014).  
3
 For a more elaborate plea, see my: Oratio pro PESCO – Egmont Paper 91 (Brussels, Egmont, 2017), 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ep91.pdf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
